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The Allocation of a Limited Number of Authorisations
Some General Requirements from European Law
Johan Wolswinkel, LLM, MSc
PhD researcher at the Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam
  Abstract
‘Limited authorisation schemes’ differ from other authorisation 
schemes in that the designated limited number of available authorisations necessi-
tates some kind of selection procedure among applicants. Consequently, questions 
rise regarding the lawfulness of such limitations together with challenges to the 
temporal and territorial scope of these authorisations. To an increasing extent, 
European law offers some general requirements for these schemes. This article 
explores these requirements by starting with the provisions in the new Services 
Directive and extending the results to a more general European framework.
 1 Introduction
Occasionally, the number of authorisations that is available 
for a certain activity is limited beforehand by the administrative authorities. 
These so-called ‘limited authorisation schemes’ differ from other authorisa-
tion schemes in that some kind of selection procedure among applicants is 
necessary whenever granting a limited number of authorisations.
Several policy areas in EU law show increasing attention to these kinds 
of authorisation schemes. For example, a system of emission allowance 
trading with national emission ceilings has been introduced at a European 
level. The Authorisation Directive contains several provisions on the grant 
of a limited number of rights of use for radio frequencies and numbers. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also dealt with several questions on 
  The author gratefully acknowledges the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO) for financial support (Toptalent) to his PhD research. A related Dutch article was 
published as: C.J. Wolswinkel, ‘Diensten tussen frequenties en kansspelen. Contouren van 
een Europees kader voor het verlenen van een beperkt aantal vergunningen’ [009] SEW p. 
87-99.
  See Directive 00/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  October 
00 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/6/EC, OJ 00, L 75/.
  Directive 00/0/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 00 on 
the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ 00, L 08/.
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limited authorisation schemes, for example in the area of gambling activi-
ties.
The adoption of the Services Directive5 marks a new era since this direc-
tive contains some general provisions on limited authorisation schemes. 
These provisions, concerning the selection procedure and the duration of 
the authorisation, build on a new distinction between authorisations that 
are limited in number ‘because of the scarcity of available natural resources 
or technical capacity’6 and authorisations that are limited in number ‘by an 
overriding reason relating to the public interest’.
This article aims at answering the following question: which general 
requirements on the allocation7 of a limited number of authorisations can 
be derived from European law? By ‘general requirements’, we mean require-
ments that can be applied in principle to all limited authorisation schemes 
or to a generalised category of these authorisation schemes. In answering 
this question as to general requirements, we restrict ourselves to some key 
questions which are characteristic for limited authorisation schemes.
The starting point of the analysis is the Services Directive, which only 
applies to authorisation schemes on service activities. Even with regard 
to these authorisation schemes, the Services Directive does not contain 
a complete set of general requirements. It is assumed, however, that the 
relevant provisions of the Services Directive reflect general rules that under-
lie any allocation of a limited number of authorisations. Since these general 
rules might already be visible in particular service areas, relevant provisions 
in these areas can support and complete the findings of the Services Direc-
tive. This article is restricted to considering two specific service areas which 
are often confronted with limited authorisation schemes: radio frequencies 
(electronic communications services) and gambling activities (services on 
  See most recently: Case C-/07 Liga and Bwin [009] nyp. See for a recent survey of the 
ECJ case law on gambling activities the opinion of the Advocate General in this case, para. 
59-88.
5  Directive 006//EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  December 
006 on services in the internal market, OJ 006, L 76/6. See for general discussions 
of the Service Directive, among others: G. Davies, ‘The Services Directive: extending the 
country of origin principle and reforming public administration’ [007] European Law 
Review p. -5; C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’ [008] Common Market 
Law Review p. -9; A. Hatje, ‘Services Directive – A Legal Analysis’, in: F. Breuss, G. 
Fink & S. Griller (eds.), Services liberalisation in the internal market (Wien 008) p. -0; N. 
Maydell, ‘The Services Directive and Existing Community Law’, in: Breuss, Fink & Griller 
(008) p. -, and several contributions in J.W. van de Gronden (ed.), The EU and WTO 
Law on Services (Alphen aan den Rijn 009).
6  The condition ‘scarcity of available natural resources or technical capacity’ will be abbrevi-
ated to ‘natural or technical scarcity’.
7  When considering limited authorisation schemes, the term ‘allocation’ instead of the 
general term ‘grant’ will be used mainly. Cf. Article 0 Directive 00/87/EC.
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organizing games of chance). The award of service concessions is also exam-
ined: although these concessions do not classify as authorisations but as 
public contracts, a selection should take place as well. Therefore, it is possible 
that requirements on the award of service concessions apply also to the allo-
cation of authorisations. Finally, once some general requirements have been 
identified on the allocation of a limited number of authorisations on service 
activities, this framework may be applied to authorisation schemes on goods 
as well.
The article starts with clarification of the term ‘limited authorisation 
schemes’ and with the identification of the key questions when granting a 
limited number of authorisations (§ ). Next, the sources of European law 
relevant for answering these key questions are outlined (§ ). §  analyses the 
conditions under which the number of authorisations may be limited. This 
limitation is a necessary precondition for the allocation of these authorisa-
tions. In particular, the question is addressed whether ‘natural or technical 
scarcity’ is itself an overriding reason to limit the number of authorisations. 
In § 5, general requirements on the selection procedure are considered, 
in the context of both the initial grant and the renewal. Questions on the 
temporal and territorial scope of authorisations in limited authorisation 
schemes are dealt with in § 6. In the conclusion, limited authorisation 
schemes are placed next to other, ‘unlimited’ authorisation schemes (§ 7).
 2 Limited Authorisation Schemes
 . Terminology
Although a general definition of ‘authorisation’ is lacking in 
European law,8 some specific directives define an authorisation or an equiva-
lent concept.9 The Services Directive describes an ‘authorisation’ as any 
formal or implied decision from a competent authority, concerning access 
to a service activity or the exercise thereof.0 For the purposes of this article, 
an authorisation will be defined as the permission of a public authority to 
exercise a certain (economic) activity.
8  Cf. P. Houweling, Van vergunning naar algemene regel (Den Haag 006) p. .
9  For instance, Article (a) of the Authorisation Directive defines a ‘general authorisation’ 
as ‘a legal framework established by the Member State ensuring rights for the provision of 
electronic communications networks or services and laying down sector specific obliga-
tions that may apply to all or to specific types of electronic communications networks and 
services’. This definition is too broad for the purposes of this article, since these ‘general 
authorisations’ can be opposed to ‘individual rights of use’.
0  See the definition of ‘authorisation scheme’ in Article (6) Services Directive. 
  The assumption in this definition is that the exercise of an activity includes the access to 
it. Cf. B.J. Drijber & H.M. Stergiou, ‘Public Procurement Law and Internal Market Law’ 
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Two elements of this definition merit attention. First, the public author-
ity confers a right to a private party when granting an authorisation: it allows 
a certain activity to be exercised. Because of this favouring character, it 
can be assumed that there exists a certain demand for such authorisations, 
especially if we restrict ourselves to economic activities, representing an 
economic value. Secondly, authorisations have a unilateral character as 
opposed to the bilateral character of a contract.
An authorisation can occur under different names, such as authorisation, 
licence, approval, permission, permit or concession. Concessions deserve 
some separate discussion. In its interpretative communication on conces-
sions under Community law, the Commission defined ‘concessions’ as ‘acts 
attributable to the State whereby a public authority entrusts to a third party 
– by means of a contractual act or a unilateral act with the prior consent 
of the third party – the total or partial management of services [as far as 
they constitute economic activities, CJW] for which that authority would 
normally be responsible and for which the third party assumes the risk’. It 
distinguished these concessions clearly from ‘acts whereby a public authority 
authorises the exercise of an economic activity, even if these acts would be 
regarded as concessions in certain Member States’ (authorisations) and from 
‘acts concerning non-economic activities’.5 Hence, although concessions 
are distinguished from authorisations, some acts called ‘concessions’ might 
classify as authorisations.6
What is meant by saying that the number of available authorisations 
is limited in advance? Since a limitation to the number of authorisations is 
a quantitative limitation, it may be useful to consider the interpretation of 
the term quantitative restrictions in Articles 8 and 9 of the EC Treaty on 
the free movement of goods. In Geddo, the ECJ defined quantitative restric-
tions broadly as ‘measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, 
according to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit’.7 
Measures having equivalent effect need not take the form of such a restraint. 
[009/] Common Market Law Review p. 8, describing an authorisation as ‘a permission to 
engage in a certain (economic) activity’.
  In Deliège, the ECJ ruled that the pursuit of an activity as an employed person or the provi-
sion of services for remuneration must be regarded as an economic activity, provided that the 
work performed is genuine and effective and not such as to be regarded as purely marginal 
and ancillary. See Joined Cases C-5/96 and C-9/97 Deliège [000] ECR I-59, para. 5 
and 5.
  See also Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 8.
  See recital 9 of the preamble of the Services Directive.
5  See the Commission interpretative communication on concessions under Community law, 
OJ 000, C /5. In fact, a concession being a unilateral act with prior consent, has a bilat-
eral character as well.
6  See for instance Case C-6/99 Connect Austria [00] ECR I-597, para. 7.
7  Case /7 Geddo [97] ECR 865, para. 7.
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In Dassonville, the ECJ gave a broad definition of these measures within 
the meaning of Article 8, ruling that ‘the prohibition of measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions […] covers all legislation of the 
Member States that is capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-Community trade.’8
Although these definitions of quantitative restrictions are useful when 
defining the phenomenon of a limited number of available authorisations, it 
should be emphasized that not every quantitative restriction implies a limita-
tion to the number of authorisations. For example, if a licence allows import-
ing a fixed maximum number of units of certain goods, then the number of 
available licences need not have to be limited beforehand. However, if only a 
limited number of licences are available for the import of those goods, then 
the quantitative restriction is a limitation to the number of licences. 
We shall use the term ‘limited authorisation schemes’ only if the restric-
tion itself is a limitation of the number of authorisations or if there is an 
immediate link between the restriction and a limitation of the number of 
authorisations. This definition fits with the distinction between quantitative 
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect in Articles 8 and 9 EC. 
Hence, ‘measures having equivalent effect’ to a limitation of the number 
of available authorisations – such as authorisation schemes with a granting 
condition that only a limited number of applicants can fulfil – fall outside 
the scope of this article.
Thus, a limitation to the number of available authorisations can first 
consist of an explicit quantitative restriction, like a legal monopoly or 
another legal maximum of available authorisations. In such cases, the legal 
provision stipulates explicitly how many authorisations may be granted at 
most. For example, Article 6() Wet op de Kansspelen (Dutch Gambling Act) 
restricts the number of authorisations for organizing bets on sporting events 
to one.
Secondly, the number of available authorisations can be limited in a more 
implicit manner. In those cases, the design of the authorisation scheme 
amounts to a limitation to the number of authorisations. This is the case 
when a limitation to the number of authorisations follows directly from 
another quantitative variable or from a territorial restriction. An example of 
the first is a requirement according to which no more than one newspaper 
shop or one driving school may be opened for a given number of people, say 
000 inhabitants. A requirement limiting the number of service providers 
according to a minimum geographical distance between providers, say at 
least 5 kilometres between two petrol stations, is an example of a territorial 
8  Case 8/7 Dassonville [97] ECR 87, para. 5, and Case C-/07 Commission v. Germany 
[008] ECR I-695, para. 8. See with respect to Article 9: Case 5/79 Groenveld [979] 
ECR 09, para. 7.
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restriction resulting in a quantitative restriction. 9 Thus, the territorial scope 
of an authorisation may limit the number of available authorisations. Never-
theless, not every territorial restriction implies a quantitative restriction. For 
example, if a service provider may only provide services within a radius of 0 
kilometres, there is no limitation in advance to the number of service provid-
ers within that area.
A territorial restriction might imply a restriction to the number of 
available authorisations if the authorisation concerns the use of a natural 
resource which is only available in limited quantity. Here, the territorial 
restriction is not a legal, but a natural restriction. A clear example is the 
storage licence in Article 5 Mijnbouwwet (Dutch Mining Act), on the basis 
of which minerals may be stored under the ground: since only a limited 
number of places are suitable for storage, only a limited number of licences 
can be granted.
We should make a final note on terminology. The term ‘scarce licences’ 
has been used in academic literature to describe the situation in which there 
are only a limited number of available authorisations. Under this defini-
tion, all authorisations that are limited in number are scarce, irrespective 
of the reason for this restriction.0 However, the term ‘scarce licences’ has 
been used in a more restrictive meaning as well, referring only to authorisa-
tions that are limited in number ‘because of natural or technical scarcity’. 
In order to prevent misunderstanding, the term ‘scarce licences’ or ‘scarce 
authorisations’ will be avoided in this article. Instead, authorisation schemes 
in which the number of available authorisations is limited beforehand will 
be referred to as ‘limited authorisation schemes’.
9  European Commission, Handbook on implementation of the Services Directive (Luxembourg 
007) p. .
0  See the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Radio Spectrum Policy Memorandum 2005 (The 
Hague 006) p. 8, and M. Cave & F. Minervini, ‘Economics of spectrum: implications for 
the Netherlands’ [006/] Mediaforum p. . See in the Dutch literature for example: F.J. 
van Ommeren, Schaarse vergunningen. De verdeling van schaarse vergunningen als onderdeel 
van het algemene bestuursrecht (Deventer 00) p. .
  See in Dutch literature on the Services Directive: E. Belhadj, S.J.H. Evans & J.W. van de 
Gronden, ‘De Dienstenrichtlijn: de gebreken van de deugden? Een eerste verkenning van de 
Dienstenrichtlijn’ [007/] SEW p. 6; R.J.G.M. Widdershoven & A.P.W. Duijkersloot, ‘De 
Dienstenrichtlijn en het algemeen bestuursrecht’ [007/5] RegelMaat p. 9, and E. Steyger, 
‘De implementatie van de Dienstenrichtlijn en het algemeen bestuursrecht’ [008/] Neder-
lands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht p.  and 6.
  Cf. Case C-/97 Läärä [999] ECR I-6067, para. 7; Case C-67/98 Zenatti [999] ECR 
I-789, para. 5; Case C-/07 Liga and Bwin [009] nyp, para. 6 (‘limited authorisation’).
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 . Key Questions
Whenever the number of available authorisations is limited, 
several questions arise, uncommon to ‘traditional’ authorisation schemes. 
To put it somewhat simplistically: in traditional authorisation schemes, an 
authorisation is granted if the applicant satisfies the conditions for grant-
ing. However, if the number of available authorisations for a certain activity 
has been limited a priori, then the single circumstance that all granting 
conditions have been met is insufficient to ensure granting of the authorisa-
tion. The possibility exists that the number of applicants satisfying these 
granting conditions exceeds the number of available authorisations. In such 
a situation, the administrative authorities have to make a choice by applying 
a selection procedure among (qualified) applicants. This can be illustrated by 
the following figure:5
Several selection (allocation) procedures may be applied: an auction, a beauty 
contest,6 a lottery or allocation in order of receipt of the applications (‘first 
come first served’). In all these selection procedures, there is a different 
selection criterion, like highest price, quality, waiting time or lot. It is worth 
mentioning that all these selection procedures apply to a ‘market’ setting 
where the administrative authorities create the ‘supply’, i.e. the number of 
authorisations, and the applicants create the ‘demand’. This demand is to 
be expected in particular if the authorisation represents a certain economic 
value.
To a certain extent, a procurement setting reflects the reversed market 
setting: an administrative authority demands certain goods or services, 
which can be supplied by several parties. In such a setting, the administra-
  Cf. Article 0(5) Services Directive: ‘The authorisation shall be granted as soon as it is estab-
lished […] that the conditions for authorisation have been met.’
  Of course, traditional authorisation schemes contain a more implicit element of choice in 
that several interests must be weighed against each other.
5  The circles and squares represent the authorisations and the applicants respectively.
6  A beauty contest is sometimes called a comparative test or a tendering procedure. This last 
term should not be confused with the use of this term in procurement settings.
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tive authority is not interested in the question of which party is willing to 
pay most, but rather which party demands the lowest price. Therefore, in 
procurement settings, the structure of selection procedures should some-
times be reversed. Despite these differences between limited authorisation 
schemes and procurement settings, they share the common need for selec-
tion: an equal outcome for every applicant is impossible.
When considering the design of the selection procedure, we should 
distinguish between the initial allocation and subsequent allocations. An 
extra question in subsequent allocations is whether or not (automatic) 
renewal of the authorisation of the incumbent is allowed.
If renewal is at stake, then the temporal scope of the authorisation has 
been limited. Besides the temporal scope, the territorial scope of authorisa-
tions can be limited. Although these scope questions do not arise exclusively 
in the context of limited authorisation schemes, they get their own mean-
ing in this context. For example, if only one authorisation is granted for an 
unlimited time period, then other potential candidates will not have any 
opportunity to obtain that authorisation in the future, except for withdrawal 
of an authorisation. However, if the authorisation is granted for a limited 
time period, then a losing participant in the selection procedure will have 
a new opportunity to compete for the same authorisation in the future. 
The same holds for the territorial scope of an authorisation. If this scope is 
limited to a certain area, then candidates can compete for similar authorisa-
tions in other areas. In sum, a restricted temporal or territorial scope of an 
authorisation in a limited authorisation scheme implies that more than one 
selection procedure is necessary, such that there are more opportunities to 
obtain an authorisation.
When identifying general requirements in European law on the allo-
cation of a limited number of authorisations, we restrict ourselves to the 
following three issues: (i) the lawfulness of a limitation to the number of 
available authorisations, (ii) the selection procedure and (iii) the temporal 
and geographical scope of the authorisation. Of course, several other issues 
can be considered as well. An example is the tradability of authorisations: 
if the number of authorisations is limited, then the possibility of trading 
creates the opportunity for a losing participant in the selection procedure to 
obtain an authorisation in the end.7 However, the Services Directive does 
not provide us with any guidelines on this issue.
7  The scheme for greenhouse gases emission allowance trading is based on this trading 
possibility. A proposed amendment of the Authorisation Directive aims at ensuring a 
smooth transition to the introduction of spectrum trading. See the Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 00//EC on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
00/9/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
services, and 00/0/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services, COM (007) 697 final, p. 6.
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 3 Relevant Sources of European Law
 . Fundamental Freedoms: Goods and Services
In general, an authorisation scheme is considered to be a 
restriction to one of the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty.8 These 
freedoms are related to each other, since they are all elements of the internal 
market which is described as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Treaty’ (Article () EC). In this article, we 
restrict ourselves to limited authorisation schemes with respect to goods and 
services (including establishment).
With respect to goods, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports 
and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between 
Member States (Articles 8 and 9 EC). However, the provisions of Articles 
8 and 9 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports 
or goods in transit justified on certain grounds, like public policy (Article 0 
EC). Besides, there can be ‘mandatory requirements’, like consumer protec-
tion and public health, that justify non-discriminatory rules restricting the 
free movement of goods.9
When considering the free movement of services and the freedom of 
establishment, there is no clear link with quantitative restrictions. According 
to Article  EC, ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals 
of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohib-
ited’, whereas Article 9 EC states that ‘restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of 
Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than 
that of the person for whom the services are intended’. Again, restrictions to 
these freedoms can be justified by ‘imperative requirements in the general 
interest’ or ‘objective justifications’,0 besides exceptions on grounds of 
public policy, public security and public health (Articles 6 ad 55 EC).
Although all these freedoms relate to each other via the internal market, 
they have their own legal framework and should therefore be distinguished. 
According to Article 50 EC, services within the meaning of the EC Treaty 
8  See in the context of goods: C-9/07 Commission v. the Netherlands [008] nyp, para. . 
See in the context of establishment: C-55/9 Gebhard [995] ECR I-65, para. 7. See also 
S.J.H. Evans, ‘The Services Directive: (Too) Great Expectations? An initial overview of the 
rights and obligations under the Services Directive’, in: Van de Gronden (009) p. 8.
9  See Case 0/78 Cassis de Dijon [979] ECR 69, para. 8. See more extensively on this topic: 
P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 007) p. 705-7.
0  See for instance Case /7 Van Binsbergen [97] ECR 99, para. , and Case C-55/9 
Gebhard [995] ECR I-65, para. 7.




are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and 
persons. Hence, services are defined complementary to goods, which are 
in turn defined as ‘products which can be valued in money and which are 
capable, as such, of forming the subject of commercial transactions.’ One 
characteristic of services, in comparison with goods, is that the persons of 
service provider and service recipient are relatively important. The diffe-
rence between services and establishment is a relative one: the freedom of 
establishment has to do with service provision ‘on a stable and continuous 
basis’, whereas the free movement of services relates to temporary service 
provision. 5
Despite these mutually exclusive definitions, the general legal frame-
works on the free movement of goods and services (including the freedom 
of establishment) show similarities: a restriction to one of these freedoms is 
prohibited, unless it is justified by some imperative or mandatory require-
ment.6 These frameworks are sometimes even said to be converging.7 This 
should be kept in mind when considering legal frameworks on limited 
authorisation schemes: general requirements on the allocation of a limited 
number of authorisations with respect to services might apply to goods as 
well. Nevertheless, such an extension should always be carried out carefully.
Another restriction to an immediate wide application of general require-
ments on limited authorisation schemes is the cross-border element in 
the definition of the several freedoms in the EC Treaty. Traditionally, the 
ECJ has refused to apply the rules on free movement to cases without any 
cross-border element.8 However, the weight of this cross-border require-
ment seems to have been relaxed.9 Nowadays, the nature and the substance 
of the national measure – instead of the circumstances of the case – seem 
  See on this definition for instance: Barnard (008) p. -.
  Case 7/68 Commission v. Italian Republic [968] ECR , para .
  J.W. van de Gronden, Hervormingen in een dienstbaar Europa. Over diensten, uitdagingen en 
Europees recht (Deventer 008) p. .
5  The temporary nature of service provision should not only be determined in the light of the 
duration of the provision of the service, but also of its regularity, periodicity or continuity. 
See Case C-55/9, Gebhard [995] ECR I-65, para. 5-7.
6  It is important to note that the legal framework developed in Gebhard, was intended to apply 
to all restrictions of one of the freedoms. See Case C-55/9, Gebhard [995] ECR I-65, 
para. 7.
7  See for example: K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘De interne markt: is er nog ruimte voor binnen-
grenzen?’, in: E.R. Manunza & L.A.J. Senden (eds.), De EU: de interstatelijkheid voorbij? 
(Nijmegen 006) p. 0-.
8  See for instance: Case 0/87 Gauchard [987] ECR 879, para -. This lack of any cross-
border element is called the ‘affaire interne’. See Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 86.
9  See Case C-8/98 Guimont [000] ECR I-066, para. - (free movement of goods) and 
Joined Cases C-55/99, C-59/99 to C-5/99 and C-56/99 to C-50/99 Reisch a.o. [00] 
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to determine whether the measure may have external effect and might 
therefore, actually or potentially, obstruct free movement. Therefore, if an 
authorisation scheme potentially influences intra-Community trade, then it 
falls within the scope of the fundamental freedoms.0
 . Services Directive
In the absence of any secondary legislation, the conse-
quences of an authorisation scheme should be judged within the legal 
framework of the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. On the contrary, 
if harmonization has taken place, then the consequences should be judged 
primarily within the context of the harmonising directive. As a consequence, 
(exhaustive) harmonization excludes the possibility of invoking an overrid-
ing reason outside the framework of the directive to justify a restriction to 
one of the freedoms. 
The Services Directive distinguishes itself from other directives because 
of its wide scope: it applies to all services, unless they are excluded from its 
scope in the Service Directive itself (Article ). With reference to Article 50 
of the EC Treaty, Article () Services Directive defines a service as ‘any self-
employed economic activity, normally provided for remuneration’.
There is some debate whether the Services Directive applies only to 
cross-border situations or to (completely) internal situations as well. Most 
authors seem to argue that, since harmonization has taken place through 
the Services Directive, the requirement of a cross-border element no longer 
applies. Even authors who argue that the Services Directive only covers 
cross-border situations, admit that the Services Directive will indirectly 
apply to internal situations because of voluntary harmonization. Therefore, 
either for principal or for pragmatic reasons, the Services Directive is consid-
ered to cover internal situations as well. This holds for limited authorisation 
schemes, in particular.
Next, there is some debate on the relation between the Services Directive 
and the free movement of goods. The Services Directive does not concern 
the application of Articles 8 to 0 EC, such that the manufacturing of 
ECR I-57, para. -5. See with respect to gambling activities: Case C-6/0 Anomar [00] 
ECR I-86, para. 9-.
0  See more extensively: Mortelmans (006) p. -8.
  Cf. Case C-5/77 Tedeschi [977] ECR 555, para. 5. See also Belhadj, Evans & Van de 
Gronden (007) p. .
  See for instance: Davies (007) p. -; Barnard (008) p. 5-5; Evans (009) p. 8; 
Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 86.
  Cf. B. Hessel, ‘The Effects of the Services Directive for Local and Regional Authorities’, in: 
Van de Gronden (009) p. 8-85.
  See recital 76 of the preamble of the Services Directive.
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goods is considered to fall outside its scope.5 Rules on the sale of a prod-
uct concern the free movement of goods as well.6 However, it has been 
suggested that the distribution of goods can sometimes be considered as a 
service.7 In any event, if one authorisation scheme deals with both goods 
and services, then it should satisfy the conditions of the Service Directive.8 
Therefore, it is to be expected that the Services Directive will have a wider 
scope than only ‘pure’ service provisions.9
The relevant provisions on the allocation of a limited number of authori-
sations are part of chapter III of the Services Directive.50 This chapter, 
dealing with the freedom of establishment, contains provisions on authorisa-
tions (Articles 9 to ) and on requirements prohibited or subjected to evalu-
ation (Articles  and 5).5 According to Article 5, quantitative restrictions 
should satisfy the conditions of non-discrimination, necessity (‘justified by 
an overriding reason relating to the public interest’) and proportionality. 
Article  concerns the duration of an authorisation. It allows for an excep-
tion to the obligation of an unlimited duration of an authorisation ‘where 
the number of available authorisations is limited by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest’. Article  contains provisions on the dura-
tion, selection procedure and renewal of authorisations in cases ‘where the 
number of authorisations available for a given activity is limited because 
of the scarcity of available natural resources or technical capacity’. Since 
both articles deal with the duration of an authorisation, ‘overriding reasons 
relating to the public interest’ and ‘natural or technical scarcity’ seem to be 
complementary.
5  Cf. Barnard (008) p. -5. 
6  See for instance: Case C-9/90 Boscher a.o. [99] ECR I-0, para. 8; Case C-0/0 
Burmanjer a.o. [005] ECR I-, para. - and -5.
7  Hessel (009) p. 89. See also: European Commission (007) p. : ‘When implementing 
the Directive, Member States need to bear in mind that whereas the manufacturing of 
goods is not a service activity, there are many activities ancillary to them (for example retail, 
installation and maintenance, after-sale services) that do constitute a service activity and 
should therefore be covered by the implementing measures.’
8  For example, if services are provided at a physical market and one authorisation scheme 
is applied for assigning market stands, then this authorisation scheme should satisfy the 
conditions of the Services Directive, even if most of the market stands deal exclusively with 
the selling of goods.
9  Barnard (008) p. 5.
50  The free movement of services is the subject of chapter IV of the Services Directive. When-
ever authorisation schemes make no distinction between establishment and temporary 
service provision, the provisions of chapter III of the Services Directive are relevant to 
temporary service provision as well (cf. Kamerstukken II 007/08, 579, no. , p. -).
5  A requirement is, among other things, any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit 
provided for in the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States 
(Article (7)).
73
the allocation of a limited number of authorisations
 .  Specific Service Areas: Radio Frequencies and Gambling 
Activities
We mentioned already that requirements on the allocation of 
a limited number of authorisations have been developed in specific service 
areas. These specific provisions may be helpful in completing and interpret-
ing the provisions of the Services Directive. Given the distinction between 
‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ and ‘natural or technical 
scarcity’ in the Services Directive, it is useful to consider a specific instance 
of both categories. As for natural or technical scarcity, we consider elec-
tronic communications services. The number of available authorisations for 
these service activities is sometimes limited as far as they concern the use 
of radio frequencies. This limitation has to do with the scarcity of the radio 
spectrum.5 In fact, the radio spectrum as a natural resource is not scarce 
in itself, but the possibilities to use radio frequencies simultaneously and 
without interference, are limited, given the current technological possibili-
ties.5 With respect to overriding reasons relating to the public interest, we 
consider gambling activities. A limitation to the number of authorisations 
for these activities has not to do with scarcity of available natural resources 
or technical capacity,5 but with ‘reasons of overriding general interest’, like 
‘the objectives of consumer protection and the prevention of both fraud and 
incitement to squander on gaming, as well as the general need to preserve 
public order’.55
Both service areas have been excluded from the scope of the Services 
Directive.56 Spectrum policy has been harmonized at Community level 
to a considerable extent, inter alia by the above-mentioned Authorisation 
Directive containing a specific legal framework for the assignment of 
radio frequencies. By contrast, the area of gambling activities has not been 
confronted with any form of harmonization. In its absence, the ECJ case law 
on gambling activities is based on general rules derived from the EC Treaty 
and the fundamental freedoms.57
5  See also recital  of the preamble the Authorisation Directive, characterizing radio 
frequencies as scarce resources.
5  See more extensively: G. Staple & K. Werbach, ‘The End of Spectrum Scarcity’ [00/] 
IEEE Spectrum p. 8-5.
5  See also the note by J.H. Jans under Raad van State 8 July 007, AB 007, 0.
55  See for instance: Joined Cases C-8/0, 59/0 and 60/0 Placanica and Others [007] 
ECR I-89, para. 6.
56  See Article (c) and (h) for electronic communications services and networks and certain 
gambling activities respectively.
57  See explicitly the Advocate General in his opinion on Case C-/07, Liga and Bwin [009] 
nyp, arguing that games of chance and gambling have not so far been the subject of any 
regulation or harmonisation within the Union (para. 6), that the regulations of the 
Member States concerning games of chance and gambling must not interfere with the 
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In both areas, the dividing line between goods and services is not always 
clear. With respect to lottery activities, the ECJ held that where a national 
measure restricts both the free movement of goods and the freedom to 
provide services, this measure, in principle, will be examined in relation to 
only one of those two fundamental freedoms where it is shown that one of 
them is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be considered 
together with it.58 However, in the field of telecommunications, it is some-
times difficult to determine which freedom should take priority, since the 
two aspects are often intimately linked.59 Accordingly, the question whether 
a certain restriction is justified must be examined simultaneously in the 
light of both Article 8 and Article 9 of the Treaty.60Although the Authori-
sation Directive on electronic communications services deals by definition 
with services, and gambling activities have been judged to relate primarily to 
services as well,6 these delineation questions suggest that general require-
ments on limited authorisation schemes with respect to services might also 
apply to goods. 
 . Authorisations and Service Concessions
It has already been mentioned that the allocation of a limited 
number of authorisations is to some extent the reverse of public procure-
ment of public contracts. However, both market settings are confronted with 
selection problems. Since general requirements on public procurement may 
be relevant for the allocation of a limited number of authorisations as well, 
it is worth considering public procurement law. According to settled case 
law, ‘the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the 
award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the freedom to provide 
services and goods [italics, CJW]’.6 Hence, public procurement rules are in 
obligations of the Member States in the context of the EC Treaty, particularly in relation to 
the freedoms of movement (para. 56) and that limiting the powers of the Member States in 
the field of games of chance and gambling does not have the aim of establishing a common 
market and the liberalisation of that area of activity (para. 9).
58  Case C-75/9 Schindler [99] ECR I-09, para. .
59  For instance, in Sacchi, the ECJ ruled that ‘the transmission of television signals […] comes, 
as such, within the rules of the Treaty relating to services’, whereas ‘on the other hand, 
trade in […] products used for the diffusion of television signals, are subject to the rules 
relating to freedom of movement for goods’ (See Case 55/7 Sacchi [97] ECR 09, para. 
6-7).
60  Case C-90/99 Canal Satélite Digital [00] ECR I-607, para. -.
6  See for lottery activities: C-75/9 Schindler [99] ECR I-09, para.  and 5. See for 
other gambling activities for example Case C-6/0 Anomar [00] ECR I-86, para. 56.
6  See for example Case C-80/98 University of Cambridge [000] ECR I-805, para. 6; Case 
C-507/0 Commission v. Ireland [007] ECR I-9777, para. 7.
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essence a concrete expression of several fundamental freedoms relating to 
the internal market.6
The most important directive in this respect is the Public Sector Direc-
tive.6 This directive deals with the coordination of procedures for the award 
of public contracts and contains a lot of (detailed) provisions on, inter alia, 
advertising, transparency and the conduct of the award procedure. A public 
contract is defined as a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writ-
ing between one or more economic operators and one or more contracting 
authorities (Article (a)). It can have as its object the execution of works, 
the supply of products or the provision of services. In principle, the Public 
Sector Directive does apply to all public contracts above a certain threshold 
amount (Article 7).65
If the consideration does not solely consist of payment, the public 
contract is called a concession. A service concession is defined as ‘a contract 
of the same type as a public service contract except for the fact that the 
consideration for the provision of services consists either solely in the right 
to exploit the service or in this right together with payment’.66 These service 
concessions are excluded from the scope of the Public Sector Directive 
(Article 7). Nonetheless, the ECJ ruled that in the absence of any (second-
ary) legislation, the consequences in Community law of the award of such 
concessions must be examined in the light of primary law and, in particular, 
of the fundamental freedoms provided for by the EC Treaty. Therefore, the 
award of such concessions should comply with the fundamental rules of the 
EC Treaty, in general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the ground 
of nationality, in particular.67 Again, these rules only apply if there is a cross-
6  See more extensively on this relationship between procurement law and internal market 
law: Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 805-86.
6  Directive 00/8/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of  March 00 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts, OJ 00, L /. Besides, there is Directive 00/7/EC on 
the coordination of the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors, OJ 00, L / (‘Utilities Directive’).
65  An exception is the non-priority category of services (the so-called ‘II B’-services). These 
public service contracts are solely subject to the obligations to define the technical specifica-
tions (Article ) and to send a notice of the results of the award procedure (Article 5()). 
The reason for this restricted regime is the assumption that contracts for such services are 
not, in the light of their specific nature, of cross-border interest such as to justify the other 
provisions of the directive being applicable. See Case C-507/0 Commission v. Ireland [007] 
ECR I-9777, para.  and 5.
66  Article (). The Public Sector Directive defines public works concessions as well.
67  Case C-/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [000] ECR I-075, para. 60. See also: Case 
C-/0 Coname [005] ECR I-787, para. 6; Case C-58/0 Parking Brixen [005] ECR 
I-8585, para. 9 and 50.
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border element in the award of service concessions,68 whereas the Public 
Sector Directive harmonizes internal situations on the award of public 
contracts as well.69
In so far as the consideration for a service concession consists solely of 
the right to exploit the service, the service concession bears great resem-
blance to an authorisation to provide a service. The remaining difference is 
that where an authorisation is a (unilateral) permission from an administra-
tive authority, a service concession is characterized by its bilateral nature.70 
We saw already that this distinction between service concessions and 
authorisations seems to be important in EC law. This is confirmed by the 
Services Directive, which states explicitly that it does not deal with rules on 
public procurement.7
In sum, distinctions should be made between goods and services and 
between authorisations and concessions. The Services Directive is located 
in the middle of these distinctions, since it deals with authorisation schemes 
on service activities. Due to this position, we are mainly interested in service 
areas involving radio frequencies and gambling activities as far as they are 
concerned with authorisation schemes. However, we should realise that 
service concessions can occur in these areas as well.7 Within the Services 
Directive, a distinction seems to be made between natural and technical 
scarcity and overriding reasons relating to the public interest. Whereas 
services involving radio frequencies belong to the first category, gambling 
activities are part of the second category. This distinction can be applied to 
68  Cf. Case C-/0 Coname [005] ECR I-787, para. 0. Most, if not all procurement proce-
dures seem to contain this interstate element. See E.R. Manunza ‘Alle aanbestedingen zijn 
interstatelijk’, in: Manunza & Senden (006) p. 7-89. The above-mentioned non-priority 
category of services is in general assumed not to be of cross-border interest. Only if it is 
established that these services are nonetheless of ‘certain cross-border interest’, then the 
fundamental rules of the EC Treaty apply, in particular the principles resulting from the 
Articles  and 9 EC (Case C-507/0 Commission v. Ireland [007] ECR I-9777, para. 9). 
See more extensively on the relation between ‘certain cross-border interest’ and ‘affaire 
interne’: Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 85-87.
69  Cf. Steyger (008) p. -5.
70  Cf. Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 8-8.
7  See recital 57 of the preamble of the Services Directive. Nevertheless, some authorisations 
may be called ‘concessions’ in national legislation. Recital 9 of the Services Directive 
speaks about administrative procedures for granting these ‘concessions’.
7  For gambling activities, see for an explicit example: Case C-60/0 Commission v. Italian 
Republic [007] ECR I-708, para. 0. For electronic communications services, this can be 
derived from Article  of the Public Sector Directive, which (in addition to the exclusion of 
service concessions in Article 7) excludes public contracts from the scope of the Directive 
insofar as they are intended primarily to allow the contracting authorities to exercise certain 
activities in the telecommunications sector. Otherwise, the Public Sector Directive would 
have applied to public contracts and service concessions in this sector.
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goods and to service concessions as well. These remarks can be summarized 
in the following figure:
Despite all these distinctions, there might be good reason for extending 
some results on the award of service concessions to the allocation of service 
authorisations; after all, both areas are confronted with a selection problem. 
Moreover, general requirements on the selection procedure are derived from 
the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, which do not distinguish between 
concessions and authorisations. As far as these rules are derived from the 
fundamental freedoms together, the distinction between goods and services 
should not be made too absolute.
In the following analysis the lawfulness of a limitation in advance of 
the number of available authorisations will be considered. Next, the selec-
tion procedure and the temporal and geographical scope of the authorisa-
tion will be examined. Whereas the provisions on the Services Directive 
will be the central starting point, results on the award of service conces-
sions are discussed as far as they contribute to the development of general 
requirements on the selection procedure. Moreover, recourse will be made 
to the specific service areas of electronic communications services (radio 
frequencies) and gambling activities whenever this is useful for completing, 
















 4  Lawfulness of Limiting the Number of 
Authorisations
 . Lawfulness of Authorisation Schemes
Although an authorisation scheme itself constitutes a 
restriction to one of the fundamental freedoms, an authorisation scheme is 
not prohibited per se. According to Article 9() of the Service Directive, an 
authorisation scheme is justified if (a) the authorisation scheme does not dis-
criminate against the provider in question, (b) the need for an authorisation 
scheme is justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest 
and (c) the objective pursued cannot be attained by means of a less restric-
tive measure, in particular because an a posteriori inspection would take 
place too late to be genuinely effective. When considering less restrictive 
measures, we can also think of general rules instead of individual authorisa-
tions. For example, Article 5() Authorisation Directive requires that Member 
States, where possible, in particular where the risk of harmful interference 
is negligible, shall not make the use of radio frequencies subject to the grant 
of individual rights of use but shall include the conditions for usage of such 
radio frequencies in the general authorisation.7
These requirements in the Services Directive on the lawfulness of 
authorisation schemes seem to be mainly a codification of existing case 
law.7 In Gebhard, the ECJ ruled already that national measures liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guar-
anteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: (i) they must be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner, (ii) they must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest, (iii) they must be suitable for secur-
ing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and (iv) they must 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.75 This legal frame-
work remains relevant for service activities excluded from the scope of the 
Services Directive, like gambling activities.76 The same holds for authorisa-
tion schemes with respect to goods.77
 . Lawfulness of Limited Authorisation Schemes
If an authorisation scheme itself amounts to a restriction 
of the free movement of goods or services or the freedom of establish-
7  It should be stressed that the Authorisation Directive distinguishes general authorisations 
from individual rights of use. See above note 9.
7  See Davies (007) p. . Evans (009) p. 9, argues that this is not entirely true.
75  Case C-55/9 Gebhard [995] ECR I-65, para. 7. 
76  See for example for gambling activities: Case C-/0 Gambelli [00] ECR I-0, para. 
6 and 65, referring to Gebhard as well.
77  See recently: Case C-9/07 Commission v. Netherlands [008] nyp, para. .
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ment, then a limitation of the number of available authorisations is an even 
stronger restriction: even if the granting conditions have been met, then the 
authorisation is not guaranteed. It follows from the Services Directive that a 
restriction on the number of available authorisations is not prohibited per se: 
quantitative restrictions, like limited authorisation schemes,78 are not listed 
under Article  (‘prohibited requirements’), but under Article 5 (‘require-
ments to be evaluated’).
The Services Directive gives the following framework for evaluating 
the lawfulness of a limitation to the number of available authorisations. 
According to Article 5() jo. 5(), quantitative or territorial restrictions79 
are only allowed if they satisfy the conditions of non-discrimination, neces-
sity and proportionality. The condition of non-discrimination implies that 
requirements must be neither directly nor indirectly discriminatory accord-
ing to nationality (paragraph (a)). On the basis of the condition of neces-
sity, requirements must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the 
public interest (paragraph (b)). Several reasons have been recognized in 
the case law of the European Court of Justice as overriding reasons relat-
ing to the public interest, like public policy, public health and protection of 
consumers.80 In relation to quantitative restrictions, it is important to note 
that grounds of an economic nature have not been recognized as overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest.8 Finally, according to the condition of 
proportionality, (i) requirements must be suitable for securing the attain-
ment of the objective pursued, (ii) they must not go beyond what is neces-
sary to attain that objective and (iii) it must not be possible to replace those 
requirements with other, less restrictive measures which attain the same 
result (paragraph (c)). It is clear that this framework resembles the legal 
framework for the lawfulness of an authorisation scheme itself.
The application of these conditions is illustrated very well in the area of 
gambling activities. In Gambelli, the ECJ repeated that restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment must be justified by imperative requirements in 
the general interest, must be suitable for achieving the objective which they 
pursue, must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it and must 
in any event be applied without discrimination.8
78  Cf. European Commission (007) p. .
79  Given the relatedness between quantitative and territorial restrictions when limiting the 
number of available authorisations, Article 5() Services Directive is right in mentioning 
territorial restrictions next to quantitative restrictions.
80  See for a non exhaustive account: Article (8) and recital 0 of the preamble of the Services 
Directive.
8  See Case C-60/0 Commission v. Italian Republic [007] ECR I-708, para. 5. See also: 
European Commission (007) p. . 
8  Case C-/0 Gambelli [00] ECR I-0, para. 65. With regard to the condition of suit-
ability, the ECJ added that the restrictions must serve to limit betting activities ‘in a consis-
tent and systematic manner’ (para. 67).
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The ECJ has recognized several reasons of overriding general interest 
justifying a restriction: consumer protection, the prevention of both fraud 
and incitement to squander on gaming, the general need to preserve public 
order, etc.8 However, invoking these overriding reasons is not sufficient 
to justify a legal monopoly on gambling activities. Such a monopoly or any 
other limitation of the number of authorisations must also be suitable and 
necessary to achieve the invoked objectives.8
In Dutch case law, legal monopolies on casinos and betting on sporting 
events and horse-racing have been judged to be suitable and proportionate. 
According to the Raad van State (Council of State), it is plausible that admit-
ting only one licensee does not only simplify the monitoring of the licensee, 
but also prevents competition between licensees with the risk of increasing 
gambling addiction.85 However, the European Commission is of the opinion 
that the Dutch legal monopoly on betting on sporting events infringes Arti-
cle 9 of the EC Treaty.86
This current discussion between the European Commission and the 
Dutch government makes clear that the justification of an authorisation 
scheme differs from the justification of a limitation to the number of author-
isations. For example, the need for monitoring might justify an authorisation 
scheme, but not necessarily a limitation to the number of authorisations.87 
8  See for example: Case C-75/9 Schindler [99] ECR I-09, para. 57-60; Case C-/97 
Läärä [999] ECR I-6067, para.  and ; Case C-67/98 Zenatti [999] ECR I-789, para. 
; Case C-/0 Gambelli [00] ECR I-0, para. 67; Joined Cases C-8/0, 59/0 and 
60/0 Placanica and Others [007] ECR I-89, para. 6; Case C-60/0 Commission v. 
Italian Republic [007] ECR I-708, para. 7, and Case C-/07 Liga and Bwin [009] nyp, 
para. 56.
8  See more extensively on the principle of proportionality and the review of restrictions on 
free movement, in particular with regard to gambling activities: J.H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. 
Prechal & R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen 007) p. 5-
60.
85  Raad van State  May 008, LJN BD8, para. .5.7 (betting on sporting events and 
horse-racing) and Raad van State  March 007, AB 007, , note by J.H. Jans, para. 
.6.. (casinos).
86  See the reasoned opinion of the Commission, 00/5, C (008) 68, annex to Kamer-
stukken II 008/09, 557, no. 98. According to the Commission, the objectives of combat-
ing criminality and reducing gambling activities might justify an authorisation scheme. 
However, whereas combating criminality is not an overriding reason justifying a limited 
authorisation scheme in the form of a legal monopoly, the objective of reducing gambling 
activities is, although an overriding reason for a legal monopoly, not being pursued in a 
consistent and systematic manner (para. 5 and 78). See also on this discussion: Kamer-
stukken II 006/07, 557, no. 77, and Kamerstukken II 008/09, 557, no. 9.
87  Cf. Raad van State 8 July 007, AB 007, 0, note by J.H. Jans, para. .5.8, where the 
monitoring argument was insufficient to justify automatic renewal of certain gambling 
authorisations.
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This requirement of subsidiarity (‘less restrictive measures’) can be seen in 
the area of electronic communications services as well: the reason justify-
ing an authorisation scheme for the use of radio frequencies, i.e. the risk of 
harmful interference, differs from the reason for justifying a restriction of 
the number of authorisations, which is the need to ensure the efficient use 
of radio frequencies.88
In conclusion, when considering the lawfulness of a restriction to the 
number of authorisations, it should be first verified whether the overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest in fact justify an authorisation scheme 
as such or whether they also justify a limitation to the number of available. 
Next, even if overriding reasons relating to the public interest do justify a 
limitation to the number of authorisations, it should be verified whether the 
conditions of non-discrimination and proportionality are satisfied as well.
 . Natural or Technical Scarcity
The Services Directive seems to distinguish between 
authorisations which are limited in number ‘because of scarcity of avai-
lable natural resources or technical capacity’ (Article ) and authorisations 
which are limited in number ‘by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest’ (Article ). In order to determine the exact relation between these 
two ‘reasons’, the question should be addressed what is meant by ‘scarcity of 
available natural resources or technical capacity’. Next, it should be observed 
whether natural or technical scarcity can be seen as an ‘overriding reason’.
The first draft of the Services Directive gave two examples of authorisa-
tion schemes falling under the scope of Article : the award of analogue 
radio frequencies and the exploitation of a hydro-electric plant.89 The first 
example has been left out of the final version because electronic commu-
nications services are excluded from the scope of the Services Directive. 
Although it is not entirely clear why the other example has been deleted,90 a 
reason might be that the generation of electricity by water force is considered 
to fall under the free movement of goods, hence falling outside the scope of 
the Directive.9
88  See Article 5() and Article 5(5) Authorisation Directive respectively. 
89  See recital 8 of the preamble of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on services in the internal market, COM (00)  final.
90  Nonetheless, it is clear that this example has been deleted for some explicit reason: in some 
intermediate version of the Services Directive, this example had already been left out, 
whereas the award of radio frequencies was still mentioned. See Council of the European 
Union, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services 
in the internal market, no. 56/05, p. 7.
9  Cf. Barnard (008), p. 55. See also: P. Sablière, ‘La mise en concurrence des concessions de 
force hydraulique’ [007] AJDA p. 05.
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The final version of the Services Directive does not only lack examples, 
but also a definition of ‘scarcity’. Although its meaning might seem clear at 
first sight, it should be realised that there is no univocal definition of scar-
city. A common economic definition says that goods are scarce when their 
quantity is limited in relation to their capacity to satisfy needs.9 Given this 
definition, almost all goods are scarce. Since scarcity of goods is defined in 
relation to other goods, this notion of scarcity is called relative scarcity.9 
An opposite notion of scarcity is that of absolute scarcity. According to 
this definition, goods are scarce if their quantity has a finite physical limit 
(and cannot be extended by human intervention). Therefore, whereas relative 
scarcity presupposes the possibility of choice, this possibility is absent in the 
case of absolute scarcity.9
A related distinction is that between natural and artificial scarcity.95 
Natural scarcity can be related to absolute scarcity: there is no possibility of 
increasing the quantity of certain goods. This holds in particular for natural 
resources, like soil, water or minerals.96 Sometimes, resources themselves 
are available in unlimited quantity, but simultaneous use of this resource 
might be technically impossible. A good example is the radio spectrum with 
its radio frequencies. In that case, there is no natural scarcity, but technical 
scarcity. Both kinds of scarcity differ from artificial scarcity in the sense 
that the possibility to increase the supply exists only in the case of artificial 
scarcity.
When considering scarcity of available natural resources within the 
meaning of Article , the notion of absolute scarcity seems most relevant. 
Authorisation schemes in the Mining Act illustrate this concept of absolute 
scarcity. However, the mining licence to extract minerals (Article 6 Mining 
Act) concerns the free movement of goods, so it is considered to fall outside 
the scope of the Services Directive.97 On the contrary, the licence in Article 
5 Mining Act for the storage of minerals, like gas or greenhouse gases, 
is considered to fall within the scope of the Services Directive.98 There is 
9  See G. Montani, ‘Scarcity’, in: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave. 
A Dictionary of Economics (Basingstoke 00) p. 5.
9  S. Baumgärtner, C. Becker, M. Faber & R. Manstetten, ‘Relative and absolute scarcity of 
nature. Assessing the roles of economics and ecology for biodiversity conservation’ [006] 
Ecological Economics p. 89. 
9  See more extensively: Baumgärtner, Becker, Faber & Manstetten (006) p. 88-9.
95  See for further refinements: J. Elster, Local Justice. How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods 
and Necessary Burdens (Cambridge 99) p. , who distinguishes (weakly or strongly) natu-
ral, quasi-natural and artificial scarcity.
96  The term ‘natural resources’ can be found in Article 7 of the EC Treaty: ‘a prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources’ is one of the objectives of environmental policy of 
the Community.
97  Kamerstukken II 007/08, 79, no. , p. 0.
98  Kamerstukken II 007/08, 579, no. , p. .
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absolute scarcity, since only a limited number of underground sites – namely 
sites that have been ‘emptied’ before – can be filled with these substances.
Nevertheless, the notion of relative scarcity remains important for the 
application of Article  as well. If some natural resource can be used for 
several applications, administrative authorities should decide which quantity 
of the resource is available for which application: the greater the quantity of a 
natural resource given for a certain application, the smaller the quantity left 
for other applications. In this respect, Dutch radio spectrum policy makes a 
useful distinction between allocation scarcity and assignment scarcity. Allo-
cation scarcity means that the administrative authorities have to choose 
between different kinds of applications before allocating frequencies: which 
bandwidths of the radio spectrum are available for which applications?99 
After this choice, there can be situations in which the number of licences for 
a certain application within a certain bandwidth is limited. If the number of 
interested parties exceeds the number of available licences or if there is more 
than one interested party for one specific licence, then there is assignment 
scarcity.00 Therefore, the mere fact that a larger quantity of some natural 
resource could have been available for a certain application (even up to the 
level of satisfaction), does not take away the presence of scarcity if insuffi-
cient quantity of this resource had been left for other applications. In such a 
situation, it could be argued that the condition of scarcity in the meaning of 
Article  would be fulfilled as well.
On the contrary, the mere fact that an authorisation concerns the use of a 
natural resource is insufficient for satisfying the scarcity condition of Article 
; there can be situations in which a limited quantity of a natural resource 
has been made available for a certain application, without this limited quan-
tity being the result of limited availability of that natural resource. For exam-
ple, the service activity of organizing a market involves the use of public 
ground. However, the fact that only one authorisation is available for the 
organization of a market does not result from scarcity of the public ground; 
the limited availability of the public ground results from the fact that a 
market should not be too large in order to remain attractive for consumers.
In addition to the term ‘scarcity’ the relationship between ‘natural 
resources’ and ‘technical capacity’ deserves some attention. Scarcity of 
natural resources depends on temporal and geographical circumstances 
and on technical developments.0 Technological change can increase 
natural resource availability because more quantity can be made available 
or less quantity is needed for a certain application.0 Consequently, natural 
resource availability and technical developments go together. Therefore, 
99  Radio Spectrum Policy Memorandum 2005 (006) p. 5.
00  Radio Spectrum Policy Memorandum 2005 (006) p. 8.
0  Baumgärtner, Becker, Faber & Manstetten (006) p. 9.
0  S.P.A. Brown & D. Wolk, ‘Natural Resource Scarcity and Technological Change’ [000/] 
Economic & Financial Review p. -.
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it seems reasonable to consider both kinds of scarcity (‘natural scarcity’ 
and ‘technical scarcity’) in relation to each other. Nevertheless, the word-
ing of Article  of the Services Directive (‘scarcity of the available natural 
resources or technical capacity’) seems to keep open the possibility that there 
is no connection between natural and technical scarcity.
If available technical capacity is an autonomous reason for scarcity, then 
the scope of Article  is broadened. One can think especially of network 
industries or ‘natural monopolies’, like drinking water, energy and trans-
port. In these industries, there is no scarcity of available natural resources.0 
However, simultaneous use of a network is sometimes limited because of 
technical impossibilities (‘scarcity of available technical capacity’). Nonethe-
less, even under a broad interpretation of this concept of ‘natural or techni-
cal scarcity’, the conclusion seems justified that only a few authorisation 
schemes fall within the scope of Article  of the Services Directive.0
 . Natural or Technical Scarcity: An Overriding Reason? 
The next question is whether natural or technical scarcity 
can be considered as an overriding reason relating to the public interest. It 
follows from Article 5() of the Services Directive that every quantitative 
restriction must be justified by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest. Therefore, ‘natural or technical scarcity’ should classify as such a 
reason as well. However, at the same time, the Services Directive seems to 
assume a distinction between ‘natural and technical scarcity’ (Article ) 
and ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ (Article ).05 The 
preamble of the Services Directive seems to confirm this distinction by stat-
ing that the number of authorisations can be limited ‘for reasons other than 
0  The fact that only one network is available (for authorisation) follows from economic 
reasons only: it is not profitable for more than one party to be active at a certain market, 
although there are physical possibilities to build a second network. In its original meaning, 
the concept of ‘natural monopoly’ did apply to natural resources in limited supply. See M. 
Mosca, ‘On the origins of the concept of natural monopoly: Economies of scale and compe-
tition’ [008] The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought p. -. 
0  In many cases, network industries fall outside the scope of the Services Directive, because 
they concern the free movement of goods or are excluded from its scope, like transport 
(Article (d) Services Directive). Because of the limited scope of Article , the Dutch 
government did not implement this article in the general Services Act (see Kamerstukken II 
007/08, 579, no. , p. 9 and ).
05  The phrase ‘by an overriding reason relating to the public interest’ in Article (b) was not 
included in the first draft of the Services Directive, but has been added in a later stage for 
reasons of clarification only. See Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on services in the internal market, COM (006) 60 final.
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scarcity of natural resources or technical capacity’.06 Obviously, these other 
reasons should be overriding reasons relating to the public interest.07 This 
would suggest that ‘natural or technical scarcity’ is not an overriding reason 
in itself.08
A parallel with the allocation of radio frequencies can solve this apparent 
contradiction.09 According to recital  of the preamble of the Authorisation 
Directive, individual rights of use should not be restricted except where this 
is unavoidable in view of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the need to ensure 
the efficient use thereof. In connection with this recital, Article 5(5) of the 
Authorisation Directive states that Member States shall not limit the number 
of rights of use to be granted except where this is necessary to ensure the effi-
cient use of radio frequencies. In other words: although scarcity of the natural 
resource (radio spectrum) is a necessary condition, it is in itself not a suffi-
cient reason to limit the number of authorisations. The only sufficient reason 
is the need to ensure the efficient use of radio frequencies. Hence, efficient 
use of a natural resource may be considered as an overriding reason relating to 
the public interest, but not the scarcity of the natural resource itself.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that there is no direct link 
between scarcity of a natural resource and limiting the number of available 
authorisations. Admittedly, physical properties of a natural resource, e.g. the 
radio spectrum, in relation to the state of technology can limit the extent to 
which this resource can be shared. But even if nature and technology place 
an upper limit to the number of authorisations available for granting, this 
upper limit is not always reached, since the determination of the number of 
available authorisations does not depend only on technical considerations, 
but on economic considerations as well.0 In other words, the size of scar-
city of a natural resource does not in itself imply the size of the number of 
authorisations.
06  The relevant part of recital 6 of the preamble reads as follows: ‘This provision [Article 
, CJW] should not prevent Member States from limiting the number of authorisations 
for reasons other than scarcity of natural resources or technical capacity. These authorisa-
tions should remain in any case subject to the other provisions of this Directive relating to 
authorisation schemes.’
07  See also European Commission (007) p. 7.
08  It should be emphasized that scarcity as such is neither mentioned as an overriding reason 
in the list of Article (8) nor in the list of recital 0 of the preamble of the Services Direc-
tive.
09  This apparent contradiction might be simply due to some poor drafting of (the final version 
of) the Services Directive. See for instance: Barnard (008) p. -.
0  For example, whereas a bandwidth of 5 MHz was the technical minimum to provide UMTS 
services in the Netherlands, a bandwidth of 5 MHz was necessary to provide these services 
on a cost-effective basis (Kamerstukken II 999/000, 095, no. 55, p. 7).
  The abovementioned storage licence in the Mining Act illustrates these observations. On 
the basis of the proposed Articles b and c Mining Act, the area for which a storage 
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It is therefore contended that natural or technical scarcity is not a reason 
justifying a restriction to the number of authorisations, but a fact that ‘acti-
vates’ certain overriding reasons relating to the public interest. These over-
riding reasons might be linked closely with that natural resource, like the 
need of ensuring an efficient use of a scarce natural resource or the need of 
preventing harmful interference. However, ‘general’ overriding reasons, like 
public order or public safety, can be activated by natural or technical scarcity 
as well. It is also possible that other overriding reasons do justify a limitation 
to the number of authorisations, whereas the reasons activated by natural or 
technical scarcity do not. Finally, whenever several overriding reasons are 
invoked to justify a quantitative restriction, these reasons should be weighed 
against each other. In so far as the overriding reasons activated by natural or 
technical scarcity are decisive for the limitation to the number of authorisa-
tions, this authorisation scheme should fall within the scope of Article  of 
the Services Directive.
There might be some support in the Services Directive for this reading, 
holding that natural or technical scarcity is not a reason complementary to 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest. Article  speaks about 
‘limited because of’, whereas Article  speaks about ‘limited by’. This 
wording indicates that overriding reasons and scarcity are incomparable 
quantities. The European Commission suggests the same incomparability: 
‘Limitations on the number of available authorisations are only permissible 
if they are motivated by the scarcity of available natural resources or techni-
cal capacity or if they are justified by an overriding reason relating to the 
public interest [italics, CJW].’ In any event, this interpretation of overriding 
reasons activated by natural or technical scarcity fits with Article 5: every 
licence has been granted, can be reduced, provided that both remaining areas are demar-
cated in such a way that in both areas the exercise of storage activities can take place in the 
best possible manner, both technically and economically (Kamerstukken II 007/08, 79, 
no. ).
  For example, there might be possibilities for sharing: a frequency band might be used 
by several parties. See Radio Spectrum Policy Memorandum 2005 (006) p. . Another 
example is an allocation plan for the (scarce) ground, indicating which ground may be used 
for which application without introducing an authorisation scheme. See also Van Ommeren 
(00) p. 70-7, and the Taskforce Vereenvoudiging Vergunningen, Eenvoudig vergunnen 
(The Hague 005) p. 5, considering the allocation of scarcity as a valid motive that might 
urge to public regulation by either general rules or an authorisation scheme. 
  It should be admitted directly that the wording of Article  (‘because of’) points more 
into the direction of a reason than the wording of Article  (‘by’). Furthermore, recital 6 
states that the number of authorisations can be limited ‘for reasons other than scarcity of 
natural resources or technical capacity’. Hence, this recital suggests that scarcity of natural 
resources or technical capacity is a reason itself. 
  European Commission (007) p. 7.
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quantitative restriction must be justified by an overriding reason relating to 
the public interest.
Whenever reference is made below to ‘limited authorisation schemes 
because of natural or technical scarcity’, this is meant to infer limited 
authorisation schemes, justified by overriding reasons which are activated 
by natural or technical scarcity. Limited authorisation schemes, justified 
by other overriding reasons relating to the public interest, are sometimes 
referred to as ‘other limited authorisation schemes’.
 5 Selection Procedure: Grant and Renewal
 5. Equal Treatment and Transparency: Service Concessions
Once we have established a general legal framework on 
limiting the number of authorisations, we are interested in general require-
ments on the selection procedure. Here, we start with the award of service 
concessions instead of the allocation of a limited number of authorisations, 
since the legal framework on the award of these service concessions has 
been developed further. 
When considering the award of service concessions – and more generally: 
public contracts – the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and 
transparency are the leading principles.5 These principles are closely related 
to each other and can all – to some extent – be reduced to the principle of 
equality. The prohibition of discrimination can be considered as an expres-
sion of the general principle of equality (equal treatment).6 This holds in 
particular for the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, as 
laid down in Article  EC.7 Articles  and 9 EC (freedom of establish-
ment and free movement of services), which are more specific expressions 
of the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, are 
sometimes considered to be particular expressions of the principle of equal 
treatment as well.8 The principle of transparency has been referred to as 
the corollary of the principle of equal treatment.9 Moreover, the principle 
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality has been said to imply, in 
particular, an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting 
authority to be satisfied that this principle has been complied with.0
5  See recital  of the preamble and Article  of the Public Sector Directive.
6  See Jans, De Lange, Prechal & Widdershoven (007) p. 0.
7  Case 80/79 Überschär [980] ECR 77, para. 6.
8  Case C-/88 Commission v. Italian Republic [989] ECR 05, para. 8. See also: Case C-
58/0 Parking Brixen [005] ECR I-8585, para. 8.
9  Case C-96/99 P Succhi di Frutta [00] ECR I-80, para. . 
0  Case C-75/98 Unitron Scandinavia [999] ECR I-89, para. ; Case C-/98 Telaustria 
and Telefonadress [000] ECR I-075, para. 6.
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In general, the principle of equality precludes comparable situations from 
being treated differently, unless the difference in treatment is objectively 
justified. It also precludes different situations from being treated in the 
same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified. It has been argued 
that this principle of equality acquires particular importance in the field of 
economic law. In this field, equality is not only a ‘constitutional necessity’, 
but also a ‘keystone to integration’: it prevents distortions of competition in 
the internal market. This is clear with respect to procurement law: the 
ECJ held that the principle of equality lies at the very heart of the directives 
on procurement law and that the purpose of such directives is to ensure 
in particular the development of effective competition in the field of public 
contracts.
It is inherent to any selection problem that equal treatment in the sense 
of an equal outcome is impossible. Therefore, equal treatment should be 
found in equal opportunities. The ECJ held that the procedure for compar-
ing tenders has to comply at every stage with both the principle of the equal 
treatment of tenderers and the principle of transparency so as to afford 
equality of opportunity to all tenderers when formulating their tenders. It 
follows from this judgment that, when providing for equal opportunities, an 
important role is reserved for transparency.
This principle or requirement of transparency5 has a specific dimen-
sion when it comes to selection procedures, just like the general principle of 
equal treatment amounts to affording equality of opportunities when award-
ing public contracts.6 It is especially in the field of service concessions 
falling outside the scope of the Public Sector Directive, that this dimension 
of transparency has been developed by the ECJ.7 In Telaustria, the ECJ held 
  T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford 006) p. 6-6. See also Jans, De 
Lange, Prechal & Widdershoven (007) p. 6 and 0.
  Tridimas (006) p. 75-76.
  Case C-/89 Commission v. Denmark [99] ECR I-5, para. .
  Case C-87/9 Commission v. Belgium [996] ECR I-0, para. 5.
5  We will not discuss whether transparency is an obligation or a principle. See for this 
discussion: S. Prechal & M. de Leeuw, ‘Dimensions of Transparency: The Building Blocks 
for a New Legal Principle?’ [007/] Review of European Administrative Law p. 6-6, and K. 
Wauters & J. Ghysels, ‘De transparantieplicht bij de gunning van overheidsovereenkom-
sten in de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie, met rechtsvergelijkende annotaties’ [008] 
Rechtskundig Weekblad p. 87. In this article, we refer to transparency both as an obligation 
and as a principle.
6  See for the various dimensions of the principle of transparency, for example: Prechal & De 
Leeuw (007) p. 5-6, and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven a.o., De Europese agenda van de Awb 
(The Hague 007) p. 85-9. E.g. Article 0(g) Services Directive requires that the criteria 
for the granting of an authorisation shall be transparent.
7  Other public contracts are subjected to the detailed provisions on transparency in the Public 
Sector Directive. See more extensively on the principle of transparency in the context of 
89
the allocation of a limited number of authorisations
that the obligation of transparency consists in ensuring, for the benefit of 
any potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services 
market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement 
procedures to be reviewed.8 In Coname, the ECJ further specified that this 
transparency requirement, without necessarily implying an obligation to hold 
an invitation to tender, is, in particular, such as to ensure that an undertak-
ing located in the territory of another Member State can have access to 
appropriate information regarding that concession before it is awarded, so 
that, if that undertaking had so wished, it would have been in a position to 
express its interest in obtaining that concession. The award of a concession 
in the absence of any transparency amounts to a difference in treatment to 
the detriment of the undertaking located in the other Member State. Unless 
such a difference in treatment is justified by objective circumstances or its 
effects on the fundamental freedoms should be regarded as too uncertain 
and indirect to warrant the conclusion that they may have been infringed, 
this amounts to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, prohib-
ited under Articles  EC and 9 EC.9 Furthermore, the ECJ ruled in 
Parking Brixen that, although the appropriateness of the detailed arrange-
ments of the call for competition depends on the particularities of the public 
service concession in question, ‘a complete lack of any call for competition 
in the case of the award of a public service concession […] does not comply 
with the requirements of Articles  EC and 9 EC any more than with 
the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.’ 
Furthermore, the ECJ held that the principle of equal treatment of tender-
ers, including the duty of transparency, is to be applied to public service 
concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of national-
ity. 0 Finally, in Commission v. Italian Republic, the ECJ observed that the 
automatic renewal of licences for horse-race betting operations without a 
call for tenders did not accord with Articles  and 9 EC, and, in particular, 
infringed the general principle of transparency and the obligation to ensure 
a sufficient degree of advertising. The ECJ added that such an infringement 
might be justified for reasons of overriding general interest, provided that 
this renewal was suitable for achieving the objective pursued, did not go 
beyond what was necessary in order to achieve that objective and was applied 
without discrimination.
service concessions for instance: I.J. van den Berge, ‘De reikwijdte van het transparantie-
beginsel bij de verlening van dienstenconcessies’ [005] Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees 
recht p. -5; Wauters & Ghysels (008) p. 86-0, and Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 
809-8.
8  Case C-/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [000] ECR I-075, para. 6; Case C-58/0 
Parking Brixen [005] ECR I-8585, para. 9.
9  Case C-/0 Coname [005] ECR I-787, para. 7-.
0  Case C-58/0 Parking Brixen [005] ECR I-8585, para. 8-50.
  Case C-60/0 Commission v. Italian Republic [007] ECR I-708, para. 5-9. In this case, 
the qualification of the particular licence as a public service concession was beyond dispute 
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It follows from this case law that with regard to selection procedures, the 
principle of transparency deals, above all, with ex ante publicity: there should 
be a sufficient degree of prior advertising. This transparency require-
ment does not imply an obligation to hold an invitation to tender accord-
ing to the detailed provisions of the Public Sector Directive, but prohibits 
a complete lack of any call for competition as well. Secondly, the principle 
of transparency turns out to serve two goals in the context of the award of 
service concessions: the creation of competition and the review of imparti-
ality. Thirdly, the principle or requirement of transparency is not absolute; 
infringements on this principle are allowed, provided that they are justified 
for reasons of overriding general interest.
Once the principle of transparency requires prior advertising, other 
elements of the transparency requirement become important as well. These 
elements can be derived from general case-law on the award of public 
contracts. The selection and award criteria must be clearly defined in 
advance and made known to the persons concerned.5 Furthermore, these 
selection and award criteria must be formulated in such a way as to allow all 
reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderers to interpret them 
in the same way, must be interpreted by the adjudicating authority in the 
same way throughout the entire procedure and must be applied objectively 
and uniformly to all tenderers.6 Hence, transparency in the context of selec-
tion procedures implies consistency, which can be seen as an element of 
equal treatment as well.7
 5.  Limited Authorisation Schemes Because of Natural or 
Technical Scarcity
Now we turn back to limited authorisation schemes. Article 
 of the Services Directive contains some requirements on the selection 
procedure:
(see para. 0).
  This is in contrast with the requirement of ex post publicity for the non-priority category 
of services (see above note 65): ‘The other procedural rules provided for by that directive, 
including those relating to the obligations to invite competing bids by means of prior adver-
tising, are, by contrast, not applicable to those contracts [italics, CJW].’ See Case C-507/0, 
Commission v. Ireland [007] ECR I-9777, para. .
  See also Wauters & Ghysels (008) p. 99-00, and Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 87.
  See more extensively for instance: W. Timmermans & T. Bruyninckx, ‘Gunningscriteria en 
transparantie bij overheidsopdrachten’ [009] Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad p. 8-5.
5  See for instance Case C-70/99 Universale Bau [00] ECR I-67, para. 99, and Joined 
Cases C-6/0 and C-8/0 La Cascina [006] ECR I-7, para. .
6  See for instance Case C-9/00 SIAC [00] ECR I-775, para. -. 
7  Cf. Tridimas (006) p. 76.
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‘1. Where the number of authorisations available for a given activity is limited 
because of the scarcity of available natural resources or technical capacity, 
Member States shall apply a selection procedure to potential candidates which 
provides full guarantees of impartiality and transparency, including, in particu-
lar, adequate publicity about the launch, conduct and completion of the proce-
dure.
2. In the cases referred to in paragraph 1, authorisation shall be granted 
for an appropriate limited period and may not be open to automatic renewal 
nor confer any other advantage on the provider whose authorisation has just 
expired or on any person having any particular links with that provider.
3. Subject to paragraph 1 and to Articles 9 and 10, Member States may take 
into account, in establishing the rules for the selection procedure, consid-
erations of public health, social policy objectives, the health and safety of 
employees or self-employed persons, the protection of the environment, the 
preservation of cultural heritage and other overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest, in conformity with Community law.’
The key obligation in this provision is that of an impartial and transparent 
selection procedure. The impartiality requirement is closely related to or 
even part of the principle of equal treatment: impartiality is necessary to 
guarantee equal treatment.8 Transparency, both in the design and in the 
conduct of the selection procedure, contributes to reviewing the impartiality 
of the selection procedure. Although we focus in this article on the transpar-
ency requirement only, it should nevertheless be stressed that transparency 
is necessary, but not sufficient for guaranteeing impartiality and equal treat-
ment.
It has been remarked in the literature that the transparency requirement 
in Article  of the Services Directive appears to spring from the case law in 
Coname on service concessions.9 Indeed, the transparency requirement of 
‘adequate publicity about the launch, conduct and completion of the selec-
tion procedure’0 seems to correspond to some extent with the transpar-
ency requirement of ‘a sufficient degree of prior advertising’ in the award 
of service concessions. Moreover, the term ‘adequate’, like ‘sufficient’, leaves 
room for several ways of publicity, depending on the characteristics of the 
authorisation. Nonetheless, it might be asked whether the requirement of 
8  Cf. Van Ommeren (00) p. 7-8.
9  See Belhadj, Evans & Van de Gronden (007) p. 8; Evans (009) p. 0-.
0  The recently proposed amendment of Article 6a Mining Act, aiming at introducing a 
transparent selection procedure with the possibility of concurring applications for the stor-
age licence, seems to be an example of implementing this requirement of adequate public-
ity. See Kamerstukken II 007/08, 79, no. , p. 0- and 5.
  Cf. Case C-58/0 Parking Brixen [005] ECR I-8585, para. 50, referring to ‘the particulari-
ties of the public service concession in question’.
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transparency has exactly the same contents in the grant of authorisations as 
in the award of concessions.
Although the requirement of an impartial and transparent selection 
procedure seems to imply prior advertising (‘adequate publicity about the 
launch of the selection procedure’), it should be realised that the goal of 
prior advertising in the award of service concessions is, according to Telaus-
tria, to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and the 
impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed. The first goal is 
related to equality as ‘keystone to integration’. This goal of competition may 
be less relevant or even irrelevant when granting authorisations. However, 
the second goal of impartiality, contributing to equality as ‘constitutional 
necessity’, preserves its full importance. This is confirmed by the separate 
mentioning of the impartiality requirement in Article ().  Therefore, it 
can be argued that transparency still includes prior advertising in the alloca-
tion of a limited number of authorisations.
Another question is which selection procedure should be used. Trans-
parency implies that the prior advertising should not only announce that a 
selection procedure will be applied, but also specify which selection proce-
dure will be applied (‘adequate publicity about the conduct of the proce-
dure’). However, Article  Services Directive does seem to neither prescribe 
which selection procedure should be applied, nor to exclude any possible 
selection procedure (auction, beauty contest, drawing of lots or ‘first come, 
first served’) a priori. 
It should be recalled that the transparency requirement in the award 
of service concessions does not imply an obligation to apply a tendering 
procedure according to the provisions of the Public Sector Directive, but 
prohibits a complete lack of any call for competition as well. With regard 
to the reversed setting of granting authorisations, an auction and a beauty 
contest are assumed to be a competitive or comparative selection procedure.5 
Article 5() Authorisation Directive requires such procedures for the grant 
of a limited number of radio frequencies.6 Since Article  of the Services 
Directive does not prescribe competitive or comparative selection procedures 
  Cf. Van Ommeren (00) p. 6, arguing that the creation of competition is not a general 
principle of administrative law.
  The need for impartiality is already clear from Article 0() Services Directive: ‘Authorisa-
tion schemes shall be based on criteria which preclude the competent authorities from 
exercising their power of assessment in an arbitrary manner.’
  Cf. Kamerstukken II 007/08, 579, no. , p. 6-7.
5  Cf. Kamerstukken II 00/0, 885, no. , p. 7 and 98. See also College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven 6 April 007, LJN BA858, para. 5., arguing that a procedure of ‘first come 
first served’ was not transparent enough to guarantee efficiency.
6  In addition, these rights of use shall be granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate selection criteria (Article 7() Authorisation Directive).
93
the allocation of a limited number of authorisations
explicitly, 7 it can be argued that the requirement of an impartial and trans-
parent selection procedure is less far-reaching than that of a competitive or 
comparative selection procedure. Hence, other selection procedures than 
an auction or a beauty contest, like the drawing of lots or ‘first come, first 
served’, can be applied as well, provided that the launch of this procedure 
has been made public adequately.8
It has been suggested that Article ()9 might leave some room for 
deviating from this transparency requirement, since it contains the possibil-
ity of taking into account overriding reasons relating to the public interest in 
establishing the rules for the selection procedure.50 However, this possibil-
ity is ‘subject to paragraph ’, which contains the transparency requirement. 
Therefore, an infringement on the general transparency requirement in 
the first paragraph does not seem to be allowed. Maybe, exceptions to the 
requirements of Article () are possible, as far as they concern the selec-
tion procedure.
This second paragraph of Article  gives a more detailed interpreta-
tion to the principles of equal treatment, impartiality and transparency. An 
authorisation within the meaning of Article  Services Directive may not 
be open to automatic renewal nor confer any other advantage on the provider 
whose authorisation has just expired. Hence, a policy guaranteeing the 
incumbent licensees a yearly renewal of their licences5 will be contrary to 
the Services Directive. However, Article () does not preclude renewal as 
such. This is also the case in the specific area of electronic communications 
services.5
However, even the formal equal treatment of all potential candidates 
might benefit the incumbent licensee. Therefore, there might be good 
reasons to confer an advantage to a new entrant, for example by putting 
aside some authorisations for new entrants or even by excluding the 
incumbent. The Authorisation Directive allows this policy in the grant of 
authorisations for radio frequencies: the preamble states that it would not be 
contrary to the Authorisation Directive if the application of objective, non-
7  Only recital 6 of the preamble of the Services Directive emphasizes the element of ‘open 
competition’ in the selection procedure.
8  The grant of authorisations in order of receipt of the applications (‘first come first served’) 
can sometimes be considered as a competitive selection procedure, since there is an incen-
tive to apply for an authorisation as soon as possible. However, this competitive element is 
absent if the start of this selection procedure is unknown.
9  This third paragraph was not part of the original version of the Services Directive (COM 
(00)  final).
50  See Belhadj, Evans & Van de Gronden (007) p. 8; Evans (009) p. .
5  See for example: Raad van State  January 000, JB 000, 69.
5  For instance, the renewal of two GSM licences in the Netherlands did only occur after the 
interests of the incumbents had been weighed against those of possible new entrants and 
the incumbents had been charged with a fee for their rights of use. See the Decision of 9 
March 007 on the renewal of GSM licences, Staatscourant 007, no. 6.
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discriminatory and proportionate selection criteria to promote the develop-
ment of competition would have the effect of excluding certain undertak-
ings from a competitive or comparative selection procedure for a particular 
radio frequency.5 The same might be argued for other limited authorisation 
schemes because of natural or technical scarcity.
 5. Other Limited Authorisation Schemes
It should not be surprising that the Services Direc-
tive requires a transparent selection procedure for limited authorisation 
schemes. The ECJ has derived the principles of equal treatment and trans-
parency from the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, which do not 
distinguish between authorisations and concessions. Also the European 
Commission emphasized that:
‘[…] like any act of State laying down the terms governing economic activities, 
concessions are subject to the provisions of Articles 28 to 30 […] and 43 to 55 
[…] of the Treaty, and to the principles emerging from the Court’s case law 
– notably the principles of non-discrimination, equality of treatment, transpar-
ency, mutual recognition and proportionality.’154
However, the requirements of Article  of the Services Directive apply to 
limited authorisation schemes because of natural or technical scarcity only. 
The question therefore arises whether the selection procedure for other 
limited authorisation schemes should satisfy a transparency requirement as 
well, although a similar provision is lacking in the Services Directive. Again, 
we take a look at the award of service concessions. This time, we are not only 
interested in the contents of the transparency requirement, but also in the 
legal basis for this transparency requirement.
In its case law on the award of service concessions, the ECJ derived a 
transparency requirement from the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty. 
Hence, the exclusion from the scope of the Public Sector Directive did not 
mean that these service concessions were not subjected to any requirement 
of transparency. The same can be argued for limited authorisation schemes. 
Article  of the Services Directive introduces the requirement of a trans-
parent selection procedure for a specific category of limited authorisation 
schemes. However, this does not imply that other limited authorisation 
schemes are not subjected to the requirements of impartiality and transpar-
ency. Since these limited authorisation schemes do not fall within the scope 
of the Directive as far as the selection procedure is concerned, the granting 
of such authorisations must be examined in the light of the fundamental 
freedoms of the EC Treaty. Hence, it can be argued that, analogous to public 
5  Recital  of the Authorisation Directive.
5  Commission interpretative communication on concessions under Community law, OJ 
000, C /6.
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service concessions, these authorisations are also subjected to a transparency 
requirement.
Another question concerns the contents of this transparency requirement: 
does the transparency requirement imply prior advertising, as in the case 
law on service concessions? Some authors have pointed out that there is no 
case law supporting the view that such a duty of analogous application exists 
and that such a step is certainly not to be welcomed when viewed from the 
fundamental principle of legality.55 However, other authors argue that the 
allocation of a limited number of authorisations should be subjected to such 
a transparency requirement as well.56 With regard to gambling activities, the 
Raad van State has asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the question 
whether the interpretation on the freedom of establishment (Article 9 EC), 
the principle of equal treatment and the principle of transparency, given 
by the ECJ in the context of public service concessions, also applies to the 
procedure of granting an authorisation for organizing gambling activities 
in a ‘one authorisation scheme’ as laid down in the Gambling Act (Wet op de 
Kansspelen).57 
Although this analogous application therefore is an open question and 
the preliminary ruling of the ECJ should be waited for,58 there might be 
good reasons for applying these contents of the transparency requirement 
to limited authorisation schemes on gambling activities and even to all 
limited authorisation schemes that are justified by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest. Already mentioned with respect to Article  
of the Services Directive is the fact that even if there is no need for competi-
tion when granting authorisations, the transparency requirement remains 
important to ensure that the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimi-
nation are complied with. Therefore, it can be argued that a transparency 
requirement consisting of a sufficient degree of prior advertising should 
hold for other limited authorisation schemes as well, without the resulting 
selection procedure necessarily being competitive.59
55  See Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 85. According to the Dutch Minister of Justice, a general 
obligation to apply a tendering procedure to Dutch authorisations on gambling activities 
cannot be derived from Case C-60/0 (Commission v. Italian Republic): the Dutch authori-
sations do not classify as public service concessions. Nevertheless, the Minister is planning 
to use ‘objective and transparent selection procedures’ for certain gambling authorisations 
in the future (Kamerstukken II 008/09, 557, no. 9, p.  and 7).
56  See Van Ommeren (00) p. 75-76; Widdershoven a.o. (007) p. 9. See for Dutch case law 
on prior advertising, although derived from the requirement of due care: College van Beroep 
voor het bedrijfsleven  June 009, JB 009/88, para. 6..5.
57  Raad van State  May 008, LJN BD8, r.o. .8.. 
58  The preliminary ruling in this Case C-0/08 (Betfair) is not to be expected before 00 
(see Kamerstukken II 008/09, 557, no. 9, p. 5).
59  On the contrary, the prevention of competition is sometimes even the reason for limiting 




A difference with limited authorisation schemes because of natural or 
technical scarcity is that the specific requirements of Article () do not 
fully apply. Next, the transparency requirement itself does not apply if the 
limited authorisation scheme does not contain any interstate element: in 
these exceptional circumstances, the fundamental freedoms of the EC 
Treaty are not infringed. Even more important is that a total lack of prior 
advertising and hence an infringement on the transparency requirement 
can, analogous to Coname and Commission v. Italian Republic, still be justi-
fied by an overriding reason relating to the public interest (‘objective circum-
stance’), provided that this infringement is non-discriminatory, suitable and 
necessary as well.60 By contrast, Article  Services Directive does not seem 
to allow for such an exception to the transparency requirement in limited 
authorisation schemes because of natural or technical scarcity.
The reasoning above leads to the implication that all limited authorisa-
tion schemes, even those justified by overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest, should – in principle – satisfy the requirement of transpar-
ency. With regard to the renewal of authorisations, it can be argued, analo-
gous to Commission v. Italian Republic, that an automatic renewal of licences 
without a call for applications infringes the general principle of transpar-
ency. Nevertheless, such a renewal might be justified for overriding reasons 
relating to the public interest. Although the Dutch Raad van State ruled with 
regard to certain gambling authorisations that the argument of keeping grip 
on the market was insufficient to justify an automatic renewal without invit-
ing any competing bids,6 it is unclear whether in other cases an automatic 
renewal without a tendering procedure might be justified as a suitable and 
necessary instrument to attain certain overriding reasons.6
As for the legal basis for this transparency requirement, we can use 
the same reasoning as was applied to the initial grant. Hence, although 
the prohibition of automatic renewal or conferral of any other advantage 
to incumbents (Article () Services Directive) does not apply to limited 
authorisation schemes that are justified by other overriding reasons, it 
follows from the general transparency requirement that such an automatic 
renewal amounts to discrimination on grounds of nationality (or an unjus-
tified difference in treatment), unless such a lack of transparency can be 
justified by an overriding reason relating to the public interest. By the way, 
this overriding reason does not have to coincide with the overriding reason 
justifying the limitation of the number of authorisations.6 
60  An overriding reason might be the need to prevent competition. If there is a total lack of 
prior advertising, then the authorisation scheme should contain other guarantees for trans-
parency and impartiality in order to satisfy the condition of proportionality when infringing 
the principle of transparency.
6  Raad van State 8 July 007, AB 007, 0, note by J.H. Jans, para. .5.8.
6  See for the preliminary question: Raad van State  May 008, LJN BD8, para. .0..
6  Cf. Drijber & Stergiou (009) p. 87.
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Once we argue that other limited authorisation schemes on service 
activities are subjected to a requirement of transparency as well, this reason-
ing can also be applied to limited authorisation schemes falling within the 
scope of the free movement of goods.6 This holds all the more if we take 
into account that the person providing services is more important than the 
person providing goods, such that a departure from the requirement of 
transparency might be justified sooner in the context of services. On the 
contrary, when this transparency requirement is derived from primary law, 
it might have a somewhat more restricted scope: it does only apply to limited 
authorisation schemes with an interstate element, whereas the requirements 
of Article  Services Directive apply to all limited authorisation schemes 
because of natural or technical scarcity.
 6 Scope of the Authorisation
 6. General
Whereas the question on the selection procedure arises only 
in the context of limited authorisation schemes, this is not the case for ques-
tions on the temporal and territorial scope of an authorisation. Nevertheless, 
such questions of scope get their own meaning within limited authorisation 
schemes: a restriction on the scope of an authorisation creates the possibility 
for other service providers to obtain an authorisation at another time or at 
another place.
Although this analysis is restricted to the temporal and territorial scope 
of an authorisation, it is important to note that other questions of scope 
can arise as well. For example, the right to use radio frequencies is speci-
fied by time, area and spectrum. The last parameter specifies the available 
bandwidth of radio frequencies in the radio spectrum. If this last parameter 
had not been specified, a right of use would contain all radio frequencies 
in a certain area at a certain time. Sometimes, these scope questions are 
absorbed into the question on the object of the authorisation. For example, 
there exists no ‘general’ authorisation for organizing gambling activities, 
but only ‘specific’ authorisations to organize specific gambling activities, 
like betting on horse-racing or a casino. It is clear that if a certain activity 
is specified more precisely in the authorisation, then more opportunities 
remain for other candidates to engage in related activities. 
6  See for instance Case C-95/0 Commission v. Finland [007] ECR I-5, para. , in which 
the transparency requirement was invoked with regard to the free movement of goods.
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 6. Temporal Scope
Article  of the Services Directive contains provisions on 
the duration of an authorisation. Its first paragraph reads as follows:
‘1. An authorisation granted to a provider shall not be for a limited period, 
except where:
(a) the authorisation is being automatically renewed or is subject only to the 
continued fulfilment of requirements;
(b) the number of available authorisations is limited by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest; or
(c) a limited authorisation period can be justified by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest.’
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article (), stating that 
‘authorisation shall be granted for an appropriate limited period’ in limited 
authorisation schemes because of natural or technical scarcity.65 This 
‘appropriate limited period’ should be fixed in such a way that it does not 
restrict or limit free competition beyond what is necessary in order to enable 
the provider to recoup the cost of investment and to make a fair return on 
the capital invested.66
This relevant part of Article () seems to be the complement of Article 
(b).67 Article () states the general rule of unlimited duration of authori-
sations.68 Moreover, it allows for some exceptions to this general rule, hence 
permitting a limited authorisation period. One of these exceptions is the 
fact that the number of available authorisations is limited by an overriding 
reason relating to the public interest. However, there is no general obligation 
to grant those authorisations for a limited period. On the contrary, in cases 
in which the number of authorisations is limited because of natural or tech-
nical scarcity, authorisations must be granted for a limited period (Article 
()).69
Such a reading of Articles  and  of the Services Directive is in line 
with similar provisions in specific service areas. In the area of radio frequen-
cies, being an example of natural or technical scarcity, the condition of a 
maximum duration may be attached to a right of use for radio frequencies. 
This condition must be objectively justified, non-discriminatory, propor-
65  Because of this conjunction, the Dutch Services Act implements these two articles in one 
article. See Kamerstukken II 007/08, 579, no. , p. -.
66  Recital 6 of the preamble of the Services Directive.
67  It could be argued as well that this provision is a species of Article (b): Article () does 
not only allow, but does even oblige to a limited duration.
68  Cf. European Commission (007) p. 6.
69  For example, Article 8 Mining Act requires that a storage licence shall be granted for a 
limited period.
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tionate and transparent. If Member States grant rights of use for a limited 
period of time, the duration must be appropriate for the service concerned.70 
Admittedly, these provisions do not contain a general obligation to limit the 
duration of an authorisation. However, this follows from the fact that these 
provisions do not only apply to rights of use in limited schemes, but to all 
rights of use. In cases where the number of available rights of use has been 
limited, a limited period does indeed seem to be the general rule.7
As for gambling authorisations under the Dutch Gambling Act, which 
are limited in number because of overriding reasons, some authorisations, 
like that for organizing a casino, are granted for an unlimited time period, 
whereas other authorisations, like that for organizing bets on sporting 
events, have a limited duration. In any case, there is no general rule prescrib-
ing a limited or an unlimited duration. Whereas the ECJ has not ruled on 
the unlimited duration of gambling authorisations explicitly until now, 
the Dutch Raad van State held that granting only one authorisation for an 
unlimited period did not constitute an unjustified restriction of access to 
the Dutch casino market, since this grant did not exclude the possibility 
that this authorisation would be withdrawn and granted to another party in 
the future.7 Hence, an unlimited duration does not seem to be excluded in 
advance.
According to Article (), an exception to an unlimited duration of an 
authorisation is possible if the number of authorisations is limited by an 
overriding reason or if it is justified by an overriding reason relating to the 
public interest. Hence, a limited number of authorisations seems to be an 
autonomous ‘reason’ for limiting the duration of an authorisation.
It might be even more systematic, given the connection with Article , 
to take a limited duration for all limited authorisation schemes as the start-
ing point. Contrary to limited authorisation schemes within the scope of 
Article , exceptions to this general rule are still possible in case of limited 
authorisation schemes because of (other) overriding reasons. Such an 
unlimited authorisation period should be justified by an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest and be non-discriminatory and proportionate 
as well. Although this approach does not follow immediately from the struc-
70  See Article 6() jo. annex B() and Article 5() Authorisation Directive.
7  In a recently proposed amendment of the Authorisation Directive, which preserves mainly 
the above wording of Article 5(), the preamble states that an individual right of use has a 
restrictive impact on free access to radio frequencies. Therefore, the validity of a non-trad-
able individual right of use should be limited in time. See Recital 5 of the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 00//EC 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
00/9/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
services, and 00/0/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services, COM (007) 697 final.
7  Raad van State  March 007, AB 007, , para. .6.., with a critical note by J.H. Jans.
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ture of the Services Directive itself, it should be emphasized that in cases 
in which the number of available authorisations is limited, a limitation of 
the temporal scope of the authorisation may be necessary in order to ensure 
that all service providers have access to the market on an equal basis.7 Of 
course, a limited duration of an authorisation hinders the exercise of service 
activities by the incumbent service provider, but an unlimited duration 
would hinder other potential candidates.
With respect to the temporal scope, the distinction between natural or 
technical scarcity and overriding reasons relating to the public interest7 
creates a complete framework for the duration of an authorisation; the two 
provisions complement each other. This framework can be applied to limited 
authorisation schemes on goods as well. The basis for this framework would 
be the free movement of goods, as laid down in Articles 8 and 9 EC. This 
would imply that, for instance, authorisations for market stands, dealing 
exclusively with the sale of goods, may only have an unlimited duration if 
there is an overriding reason justifying this duration. Again, such a justifica-
tion is only necessary if the authorisation scheme is expected to influence 
intra-Community trade.
 6. Territorial Scope
A limited temporal scope implies that after this time period, 
a selection procedure should be applied again and renewal might be consid-
ered. On the contrary, if the territorial scope of an authorisation is limited, 
then several selection procedures can be held simultaneously, since the total 
territory is divided into several parts.
We mentioned already that a territorial restriction can, but does not 
necessarily, imply a quantitative restriction. Here, we focus only on the situ-
ation that, given the quantitative restriction, there is still the possibility of 
creating a territorial restriction. Hence, we do not consider ‘natural’ restric-
tions to the territorial scope of an authorisation: if a natural resource, like 
gas, is only available at certain places, then it is self-evident that the authori-
sation only concerns these places.75
Compared with the temporal scope, the Services Directive contains few 
provisions on the territorial scope of an authorisation. Article 0() Services 
7  Cf. European Commission (007) p. 6.
7  In fact: overriding reasons activated by natural or technical scarcity and other overriding 
reasons.
75  The same holds for the temporal scope of an authorisation: if there is a ‘natural restriction’ 
to the temporal scope of an authorisation, then a temporal restriction is self-evident. See 
paragraph a of Article  Services Act, stating that if the duration of an authorisation is 
limited by nature, then the general obligation of an unlimited time period does not hold 
(Kamerstukken II 008/09, 579, no. A). An example is the authorisation for organizing a 
specific event at a specific day (Kamerstukken II 007/08, 579, no. , p. ).
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Directive states that the territorial scope of an authorisation shall not be 
limited, except where an authorisation for each individual establishment or 
a limitation of the authorisation to a certain part of the territory is justified 
by an overriding reason relating to the public interest.76 According to the 
European Commission, authorisations which are not granted for the whole 
territory of a Member State but for a specific part only are likely to hinder the 
exercise of service activities and to constitute an additional burden on service 
providers. The Commission adds to Article 0() that the restriction should 
not only be justified by an overriding reason but also be non-discriminatory 
and proportionate.77 Again, it might be argued, analogous to the temporal 
scope of an authorisation, that if the number of available authorisations is 
limited, this limitation is in itself a sufficient ‘reason’ to limit the territorial 
scope of an authorisation. It might even be argued that if the number of 
authorisations is limited because of natural or technical scarcity, then the 
territorial scope of the authorisation should be limited. Only if the number 
of available authorisations is limited by an overriding reason, there might be 
an(other) overriding reason justifying an unlimited territorial scope of the 
authorisation.
Once the territorial scope of an authorisation is discussed, the principle 
of mutual recognition comes into play. This principle is also regarded as 
one of the general principles on the free movement of goods and services.78 
Article 0() of the Services Directive states that the conditions for grant-
ing authorisation for a new establishment shall not duplicate requirements 
and controls which are equivalent or essentially comparable as regards their 
purpose to which the provider is already subject in another Member State 
or in the same Member State. This provision, which is relevant for authori-
sations without a natural restriction to a certain territory, reflects some 
features of the principle of mutual recognition.79 However, once mutual 
recognition is accepted, a limited authorisation scheme can be annulled: the 
limitation of the number of available authorisations in a certain Member 
State (or a certain part of a Member State) is useless if service providers 
76  The Commission states that individual authorisations for each establishment will normally 
be justified in cases where the authorisation is linked to a physical infrastructure (e.g. a 
shop) because an individual assessment of each installation in question may be necessary 
(European Commission (007) p. 7).
77  European Commission (007) p. 7.
78  See for the principle of mutual recognition in the ECJ case law: Joined Cases 0/78 and 
/78 Van Wesemael [979] ECR 5, para. 8-0 and Case C-76/90 Säger [99] ECR I-, 
para. -5. See more extensively on this principle of mutual recognition: J. Snell, ‘Free 
Movement of Services and the Services Directive: The Legitimacy of the Case Law’, in: Van 
de Gronden (009) p. 5-0.
79  Cf. Barnard (008) p. 55. Article 6(b) of the Services Directive reflects to some extent the 




with an authorisation in another Member State (or another part of the 
same Member State) cannot be prevented from providing services.80 Again, 
it might therefore be argued that a limitation to the number of available 
authorisations is an overriding reason itself to justify an infringement on 
the general principle of mutual recognition.
 7 Concluding Remarks
All ‘limited authorisation schemes’, i.e. authorisation 
schemes where the number of available authorisations is limited before-
hand, have some common characteristics. First, all these authorisation 
schemes have been faced with the question of whether the number of avai-
lable authorisations may be limited. Secondly, these limited authorisation 
schemes are all confronted with a selection issue: whenever the number of 
available authorisations is limited and the number of candidates exceeds 
this number of authorisations, a selection procedure is necessary to make a 
choice. Thirdly, it might be necessary to restrict the temporal or geographi-
cal scope of such authorisations in order to create equal opportunities for all 
candidates.
Until recently, there seemed to be little attention in European law for a 
general approach towards these limited authorisation schemes. The new 
Services Directive gives an impetus to a more general approach and provides 
us with some general requirements on the allocation of a limited number 
of authorisations. However, this directive does not contain one uniform set 
of requirements applying to all limited authorisation schemes. Instead, it 
distinguishes according to the reason for limiting the number of available 
authorisations. If the number of available authorisations is limited because 
of ‘natural or technical scarcity’, then an impartial and transparent selec-
tion procedure should be applied. Moreover, such an authorisation must 
be granted for a limited period. On the contrary, if the number of available 
authorisations is limited by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest, this authorisation may be granted for a limited period, but there is 
no obligation for such a restriction. Besides, the Services Directive makes 
clear that a limitation to the number of available authorisations is only 
allowed if it satisfies the conditions of non-discrimination, necessity (‘justi-
fied by an overriding reason relating to the public interest’) and proportion-
ality.
These provisions of the Services Directive provide us with an incom-
plete framework of general requirements on limited authorisation schemes. 
Furthermore, only a few authorisation schemes satisfy the criterion of 
natural or technical scarcity. However, starting with the Services Direc-
80  See for the preliminary question on this issue in the context of gambling activities: Raad 
van State  May 008, LJN BD8, para. ...
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tive, we can develop a consistent and coherent framework on the allocation 
of a limited number of authorisations. Therefore, we have considered two 
specific service areas with more advanced results on limited authorisation 
schemes: electronic communications services involving the use of radio 
frequencies and services on gambling activities. Furthermore, we have 
looked at developments in public procurement law on the award of service 
concessions, since selection procedures occur in that area as well. Of course, 
such an approach demands caution, since developments in European admin-
istrative law, either by Community legislature or by ECJ decisions, should be 
waited for on a number of issues. Nevertheless, several (preliminary) conclu-
sions might be drawn from observations in these areas.
It has been argued that natural or technical scarcity should not be 
considered as an overriding reason relating to the public interest. Instead, 
this scarcity is a fact that activates (particular) overriding reasons relating to 
the public interest. Hence, a distinction should not be made between natural 
or technical scarcity on the one hand and overriding reasons relating to the 
public interest on the other, but between overriding reasons activated by 
natural or technical scarcity and other overriding reasons. 
This amended distinction between natural or technical scarcity and 
(other) overriding reasons relating to the public interest is meaningful to 
some extent for the design of the selection procedure. In case of natural or 
technical scarcity, there is no reason to deviate from general requirements 
on transparency, since the administrative authorities – to put it simply – do 
not pursue any separate goal with the limitation of the number of authorisa-
tions; they simply had no (or at least: little) choice in limiting the number of 
authorisations. On the contrary, if the number of authorisations is limited 
because of an overriding reason, there might be good reason for deviating 
from the transparency requirement. This may be necessary to achieve the 
overriding reasons because of which the number of available authorisations 
has been limited.
Moreover, it has been argued that a transparency requirement for other 
limited authorisation schemes can be based on general principles derived 
from the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. Although the Services 
Directive is silent on this issue, there is reason to argue that, analogous to 
service concessions, such limited authorisation schemes demand for an 
impartial and transparent selection procedure as well, unless an exception to 
this general obligation is justified by an overriding reason. The requirement 
of transparency seems to consist in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential 
candidate, a sufficient degree of prior advertising such that, at least, the impar-
tiality of the selection procedure can be reviewed. Nonetheless, it is possible 
that an exception to this transparency requirement is accepted with respect 
to authorisations sooner than with respect to concessions.
With respect to the temporal and geographical scope of an authorisa-
tion, a ‘limited, unless’ approach has been suggested, comparable with the 
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‘transparent, unless’ approach for the selection procedure: if the number of 
authorisations is limited because of natural or technical scarcity, then the 
authorisation must be granted for a limited time period. In other limited 
authorisation schemes, the authorisation must be granted for a limited time 
period, unless an unlimited time period is justified by an overriding reason. 
We could apply this reasoning to the territorial scope of an authorisation as 
well.
It can be argued that these general requirements form a legal framework 
that holds for all kinds of authorisation schemes on services as well as goods. 
Moreover, this framework has much in common with the legal framework 
on public procurement law. This is not surprising since all these schemes 
demand some kind of selection procedure among potential candidates. 
In the end, it seems that European law contributes to the development 
of a self designed legal framework for limited authorisation schemes next 
to that for traditional authorisation schemes. This framework does not 
only contain requirements which are not needed in traditional authorisa-
tion schemes. On the contrary, a limitation to the number of authorisations 
seems to be an overriding reason itself to deviate from general principles 
with regard to traditional authorisation schemes. It can even be argued 
that limited authorisation schemes turn the legal framework for traditional 
authorisation schemes upside-down.
